|Commenced in January 2007||Frequency: Monthly||Edition: International||Paper Count: 3|
Since the presence of Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen), Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) has raised specific concerns related to the privacy and security, due to its vulnerable, low-level of security and limited payload. In this paper, the authors introduce and analyze the combination of Pulse Amplitude Modulation (PAM) and Phase Shift Keying (PSK) Modulation in conventional ADS-B, forming Secure ADS-B (SADS-B) avionics. In order to demonstrate the potential of this combination, Hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) simulation was used. The tests' results show that, on the one hand, SADS-B can offer five times the payload as its predecessor. This additional payload of SADS-B can be used in various applications, therefore enhancing the ability and efficiency of the current ADS-B. On the other hand, by using the extra phase modulated bits as a digital signature to authenticate ADS-B messages, SADS-B can increase the security of ADS-B, thus ensure a more secure aviation as well. More importantly, SADS-B is compatible with the current ADS-B In and Out. Hence, no significant modifications will be needed to implement this idea. As a result, SADS-B can be considered the most promising approach to enhance the capability and security of ADS-B.
The development of guidance, navigation and control algorithms and avionic procedures requires the disposability of suitable analysis and verification tools, such as simulation environments, which support the design process and allow detecting potential problems prior to the flight test, in order to make new technologies available at reduced cost, time and risk. This paper presents a simulation environment for avionic software development and qualification, especially aimed at equipment for general aviation aircrafts and unmanned aerial systems. The simulation environment includes models for short and medium-range radio-navigation aids, flight assistance systems, and ground control stations. All the software modules are able to simulate the modeled systems both in fast-time and real-time tests, and were implemented following component oriented modeling techniques and requirement based approach. The paper describes the specific models features, the architectures of the implemented software systems and its validation process. Performed validation tests highlighted the capability of the simulation environment to guarantee in real-time the required functionalities and performance of the simulated avionics systems, as well as to reproduce the interaction between these systems, thus permitting a realistic and reliable simulation of a complete mission scenario.
This paper provides a description of a Collision Avoidance algorithm that has been developed starting from the mathematical modeling of the flight of insects, in terms of spirals and conchospirals geometric paths. It is able to calculate a proper avoidance manoeuver aimed to prevent the infringement of a predefined distance threshold between ownship and the considered intruder, while minimizing the ownship trajectory deviation from the original path and in compliance with the aircraft performance limitations and dynamic constraints. The algorithm is designed in order to be suitable for real-time applications, so that it can be considered for the implementation in the most recent airborne automatic collision avoidance systems using the traffic data received through an ADS-B IN device. The presented approach is able to take into account the rules-of-the-air, due to the possibility to select, through specifically designed decision making logic based on the consideration of the encounter geometry, the direction of the calculated collision avoidance manoeuver that allows complying with the rules-of-the-air, as for instance the fundamental right of way rule. In the paper, the proposed collision avoidance algorithm is presented and its preliminary design and software implementation is described. The applicability of this method has been proved through preliminary simulation tests performed in a 2D environment considering single intruder encounter geometries, as reported and discussed in the paper.