|Commenced in January 2007||Frequency: Monthly||Edition: International||Paper Count: 9|
Formal verification is proposed to ensure the correctness of the design and make functional verification more efficient. As cache plays a vital role in the design of System on Chip (SoC), and cache with Memory Management Unit (MMU) and cache memory unit makes the state space too large for simulation to verify, then a formal verification is presented for such system design. In the paper, a formal model checking verification flow is suggested and a new cache memory model which is called “exhaustive search model” is proposed. Instead of using large size ram to denote the whole cache memory, exhaustive search model employs just two cache blocks. For cache system contains data cache (Dcache) and instruction cache (Icache), Dcache memory model and Icache memory model are established separately using the same mechanism. At last, the novel model is employed to the verification of a cache which is module of a custom-built SoC system that has been applied in practical, and the result shows that the cache system is verified correctly using the exhaustive search model, and it makes the verification much more manageable and flexible.
The scientific community has invested a great deal of effort in the fields of discrete wavelet transform in the last few decades. Discrete wavelet transform (DWT) associated with the vector quantization has been proved to be a very useful tool for the compression of image. However, the DWT is very computationally intensive process requiring innovative and computationally efficient method to obtain the image compression. The concurrent transformation of the image can be an important solution to this problem. This paper proposes a model of concurrent DWT for image compression. Additionally, the formal verification of the model has also been performed. Here the Symbolic Model Verifier (SMV) has been used as the formal verification tool. The system has been modeled in SMV and some properties have been verified formally.
The requirements analysis, modeling, and simulation have consistently been one of the main challenges during the development of complex systems. The scenarios and the state machines are two successful models to describe the behavior of an interactive system. The scenarios represent examples of system execution in the form of sequences of messages exchanged between objects and are a partial view of the system. In contrast, state machines can represent the overall system behavior. The automation of processing scenarios in the state machines provide some answers to various problems such as system behavior validation and scenarios consistency checking. In this paper, we propose a method for translating scenarios in state machines represented by Discreet EVent Specification and procedure to detect implied scenarios. Each induced DEVS model represents the behavior of an object of the system. The global system behavior is described by coupling the atomic DEVS models and validated through simulation. We improve the validation process with integrating formal methods to eliminate logical inconsistencies in the global model. For that end, we use the Z notation.
In this paper we explore the application of a formal proof system to verification problems in cryptography. Cryptographic properties concerning correctness or security of some cryptographic algorithms are of great interest. Beside some basic lemmata, we explore an implementation of a complex function that is used in cryptography. More precisely, we describe formal properties of this implementation that we computer prove. We describe formalized probability distributions (o--algebras, probability spaces and condi¬tional probabilities). These are given in the formal language of the formal proof system Isabelle/HOL. Moreover, we computer prove Bayes' Formula. Besides we describe an application of the presented formalized probability distributions to cryptography. Furthermore, this paper shows that computer proofs of complex cryptographic functions are possible by presenting an implementation of the Miller- Rabin primality test that admits formal verification. Our achievements are a step towards computer verification of cryptographic primitives. They describe a basis for computer verification in cryptography. Computer verification can be applied to further problems in crypto-graphic research, if the corresponding basic mathematical knowledge is available in a database.
In this article, a formal specification and verification of the Rabin public-key scheme in a formal proof system is presented. The idea is to use the two views of cryptographic verification: the computational approach relying on the vocabulary of probability theory and complexity theory and the formal approach based on ideas and techniques from logic and programming languages. A major objective of this article is the presentation of the first computer-proved implementation of the Rabin public-key scheme in Isabelle/HOL. Moreover, we explicate a (computer-proven) formalization of correctness as well as a computer verification of security properties using a straight-forward computation model in Isabelle/HOL. The analysis uses a given database to prove formal properties of our implemented functions with computer support. The main task in designing a practical formalization of correctness as well as efficient computer proofs of security properties is to cope with the complexity of cryptographic proving. We reduce this complexity by exploring a light-weight formalization that enables both appropriate formal definitions as well as efficient formal proofs. Consequently, we get reliable proofs with a minimal error rate augmenting the used database, what provides a formal basis for more computer proof constructions in this area.
In this paper we analyze the application of a formal proof system to the discrete logarithm problem used in publickey cryptography. That means, we explore a computer verification of the ElGamal encryption scheme with the formal proof system Isabelle/HOL. More precisely, the functional correctness of this algorithm is formally verified with computer support. Besides, we present a formalization of the DSA signature scheme in the Isabelle/HOL system. We show that this scheme is correct what is a necessary condition for the usefulness of any cryptographic signature scheme.