An Enhanced Fault-Tolerant Conference Key Agreement Protocol
Cheng-Chi Lee, Chun-Ta Li, Chia-Ying Wu, Shiow-Yuan Huang

Abstract—Establishing a secure communication of Internet conferences for participants is very important. Before starting the conference, all the participants establish a common conference key to encrypt/decrypt communicated messages. It enables participants to exchange the secure messages. Nevertheless, in the conference, if there are any malicious participants who may try to upset the key generation process causing other legal participants to obtain a different conference key. In this article, we propose an improved conference key agreement with fault-tolerant capability. The proposed scheme can filter malicious participants at the beginning of the conference to ensure that all participants obtain the same conference key. Compare with other schemes, our scheme is more secure and efficient than others.

Keywords—Conference key, Diffie-Hellman protocol, key agreement, fault tolerance.

I. INTRODUCTION

Due to the convenience of the Internet, a lot of people use the Internet to organize a conference or to communicate with each other even though they located in different places in the world. However, the network is a shared medium so that the weakness security attacks such as eavesdropping, replay attack and modification attack. Thus, we have to establish a common conference key for encrypting/decrypting our communications over an insecure network. The first conference key establishment was proposed by [9] in 1982. In general, there are two types of conference key establishment schemes: conference key distribution is proposed in [4], [7], [8], [16], and conference key agreement is proposed in [1]-[3], [10], [12]. The conference key distribution protocol needs a trusted third party (TTP) to establish a key and then securely distribute it to each participant. A conference key agreement protocol allows all participants to establish a common session key without a trusted third party (TTP). The advantage of conference key distribution protocol is low communication and computational costs, and simplicity. The conference key agreement protocol does not require TTP to establish the session key, but it needs higher communication and computational costs than conference key distribution protocol.

In 1976, Diffie and Hellman [5] proposed the first commonly known key agreement protocol that allows two participants to establish a common secret key that is used for encrypting/decrypting communications. Its security is based on the difficulty of Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP). Up to now, most conference key agreements focus on communication efficiency and privacy of conference key. Considering an example, before starting the network conference, all the members need establish a common key to encrypt/decrypt the message of the conference. But there is one or more malicious conferes who attempt to destroy the conference lead to other conferes who obtain a different conference key. To solve this problem, fault tolerant conference key agreement [6], [11], [13]-[15] was proposed by many scholars. Among these protocols, [14] proposed a fault tolerant conference key agreement. This protocol can correctly acquire a conference key even if there are several malicious conferes. However, Tzeng’s protocol requires creating $n$-power polynomials for each participant and the result of heavy computation is inefficient, where $n$ is the number of participants. To solve this problem, [6] proposed a conference key agreement protocol in 2009. Compared with Tzeng’s scheme their scheme is more efficient. However, we found Huang et al.’s protocol [6] is vulnerable to modification attack, and we also show a simple improvement to eliminate the security weakness of Huang et al.’s protocol [6].

This paper is organized as follows: in Section II, we review Huang et al.’s conference key agreement protocol, and in section III, we introduce the security flaws of the Huang et al.’s protocol [6]. In section IV we show a simple improvement to the proposed vulnerability. We discuss the security and performance of our improved scheme in the Section V. Finally, our conclusion is given in Section VI.

II. REVIEW OF HUANG ET AL.’S PROTOCOL [6]

In this section, we review Huang et al.’s [6] conference key agreement protocol. Their proposed method comprises five phases: parameter generation phase, secret distribution and commitment phase, sub key computation and verification phase, fault detection phase, and conference key computation phase. The protocol starts with an initiator who convenes a conference for a set $U$ of participants. Let $U = \{U_1, U_2, ..., U_n\}$ be the initial set of participant that want to generate a conference key. Each $U_i (1 \leq i \leq n)$ is part of $U$.

A. Parameter Generation Phase

The following system parameters and function are used throughout the paper.

$q$ A large prime.

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A large prime number comprised of $2q+1$.
A $q$-order generator over $GF(p)$.
A secure one-way hash function.
Time stamp to detect a delay and it will be updated to a new one in each conference section.
The common section key that $U_i$ shared with all other participants $U_j$.
The common section key that $U_i$ receive from $U_j$.
The subkey that $U_i$ shared with all other participants.
String concatenation operation which combines two values into one.

Meanwhile, each $U_i$ is provided with the following pair of two corresponding keys:
1. Private key is denoted by $y_i \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$;
2. Public key is denoted by $y_i^q \mod p$.

**B. Secret Distribution and Commitment Phase**

All participants $U_i$ execute the following steps to share their subkey $CK_i$ to other participants:

**Step 1.** Each $U_i$ ($1 \leq i \leq n$) randomly choose an integer $a_i \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ and computes the session key $k_i$ using other participants $U_i$’s public key $y_j$:

$$k_i = y_j^a \mod q, \ 1 \leq j \leq n$$

**Step 2.** Select a line $L(x)$:

$$L(x) = c_x x + CK_i \mod q$$

**Step 3.** Computes $d_j$ and $d_j^i$:

$$d_j = L(k_i) \mod q, \ 1 \leq j \leq n$$

$$d_j^i = k_i \oplus d_j, \ 1 \leq j \leq n$$

**Step 4.** Randomly select an integer $r_i = \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ and computes the digital signature $(R_i, S_i)$:

$$R_i = g^{r_i} \mod p$$

$$S_i = x_i + H(CK_iT) + r_i R_i \mod q$$

**Step 5.** Broadcast the message $M_i = \{T, R_i, S_i, c_j, d_j^i, d_j^2, ..., d_j^n\}$.

**C. Subkey Computation and Verification Phase**

After receiving message $M_i = \{T, R_i, S_i, c_j, d_j^i, d_j^2, ..., d_j^n\}$ from $U_j$ ($1 \leq j \leq n$), each $U_i$ recovers the subkey $CK_j$ by using $M_j$ ($j \neq i$) and $U_i$ execute the following steps. The steps of the subkey computation and verification phase are as follows:

**Step 1.** Check the time stamp $T$.

**Step 2.** Compute the session key $k_j$ using private key $x_i$ and $c_j$:

$$k_j = c_j^{x_i} \mod p \mod q, \ 1 \leq j \leq n$$

**Step 3.** Compute the subkey $CK_j$ using $k_j$, $d_j^i$ and $c_j$:

$$d_j^i = d_j^i + k_j, \ 1 \leq j \leq n$$

$$CK_j = d_j - c_j k_j \mod q, \ 1 \leq j \leq n$$

**Step 4.** Check the digital signature $(R_i, S_i)$:

$$g^{r_i} = y_j^i H(CK_iT) R_i^j \mod q$$

If the steps 1–4 are assured, broadcast $v_j^i$ = “success”; otherwise, broadcast $v_j^i$ = “failure”.

**D. Fault Detection Phase**

In this phase, each participant $U_i$ executes the following procedure if they receive $v_j^i$ = “failure”:

1. On receiving $v_j^i$ = “failure”, $U_i$ claims that $U_m$ ($m \neq i$) is faulty, each participant wait for the fault detection message $a_m$ and $CK_m$ from $U_m$. If no one receives the fault detection message, then set $U_m$ as a malicious participant;
2. On receiving message $a_m$ and $CK_m$ from $U_m$. Each participant executed the following steps to detect fault:
   a. Compute $c_m = g^a_m$, check whether $c_m = c_m^i$.
   b. Check $d_m^i$ by input $a_m$ and $CK_m$ into secret distribution and commitment phase steps 1–3.
   c. Check whether signature $(R_m, S_m)$ is correct made by $U_m$. If all the steps are satisfied, set $U_m$ as a malicious participant; otherwise, set $U_m$ as a malicious one.
3. Removed all the malicious participants from $U$ and restarted the protocol.

**E. Conference Key Computation Phase**

When malicious participants are excluded from $U$, each honest participants $U_i$ in the set of $U = \{U_1^*, U_2^*, ..., U_n^*\}$ calculates the conference key $CK$.

$$CK = (CK_1^* + CK_2^* + ... + CK_n^*) \mod q$$

**III. WEAKNESS OF HUANG ET AL.’S [6] PROTOCOL**

In this section, we point out that Huang et al.’s [6] protocol is vulnerable to a modification attack. This can lead to two different situations. One of the situations is all participants may generate different conference keys, and the other is that honest participants will be excluded from the conference. We assume that $E$ is the attacker who alters the exchanged messages in the subkey computation and verification phase.

**Situation 1.** Honest participants will be excluded from the set of participants.

First we assume $U_i$ and $U_j$ both honest participants in the set of $U = \{U_1, U_2, ..., U_n\}$. In subkey computation and verification phase, $U_i$ executes the steps 1–4 after $U_j$ receiving message $M_j$. $U_i$ verifies the steps 1–4. If satisfied, $U_i$ broadcasts $v_j^i$ = “success”.

Step 3. The attacker $E$ intercepts the message send from $U_j$.

Then $E$ modifies the message $v_j^i$ = “success” to $v_j^i$ = “failure” and broadcasts the message.
Step 4. After receiving $v_i$ = “failure”, all participants start fault detection phase. $U_i$ broadcasts fault detection message $a_i$, $C_{ki}$.

Step 5. Other participants verify $a_i$, $C_{ki}$.

Step 6. Because $U_i$ is an honest participant, so the fault detection message will pass the verification. Finally, all the participants set $U_i$ as a malicious participant and remove $U_i$ from the set of participants. In fact, $U_i$ is not a malicious participant.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$U_i$</th>
<th>$U(i\neq j)$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1. \( a_i \in \mathbb{Z}_q \)  
\( k_{ij} x_i^p \mod p \; q \leq j \leq n \)  
2. choose a line \( L(x) \)  
\( L(x) = c_i x + C_{ki} \mod q \)  
\( c_i \neq g^x \mod p \)  
3. \( d_j = L(k_{ij}) \mod q \; 1 \leq j \leq n \)  
\( d_{ij} = c_i k_{ij} + C_{ki} \mod q \)  
\( d_{ij} = k_{ij} \oplus d_{ij} \)  
4. \( r_j \in \mathbb{Z}_q \)  
\( R_j = g^{d_j} \mod p \)  
\( S_j = x^j H(C_{ki}^{T_j}) + r_j \mod q \)  
5. \( M = \{ T, R_i, S_i, c_i, d_{i1}, d_{i2}, \ldots, d_{in} \} \)|

Fig. 1 Secret distribution and commitment phase

Situation 2. All conference participants obtain different conference keys.

Set $U_i$ is a malicious participant who sends a wrong message $M_i$. One of the honest participants $U_i$ broadcasts message $v_i$ = “failure” after verifying the individual digital signature ($R_i$, $S_i$).

Step 1. $U_i$ verifies $U_i$’s individual digital signature ($R_i$, $S_i$).

Step 2. We assume $U_i$ is a malicious participant, then $g^{d_i} \neq y_j^{(T_j) C_{ki}} R_j^{m_j} \mod p$.

$U_i$ broadcasts $v_i$ = “failure”.

Step 3. The attacker $E$ intercepts the message sent from $U_i$, $E$ modifies the message $v_i$ = “failure” to $v_i$ = “success” and broadcasts the message.

Step 4. All participants compute $C_K = (C_{K1} + C_{K2} + \ldots + C_{Kn})$ mod $q$ after no more faults are detected. Actually, $U_i$ sends a wrong message $M_i$, causing all conference participants to obtain different conference keys.

The protocol is capable of fault tolerance, and this means that it can achieve the following two lemmas.

**Lemma 1.** Malicious participant $U_i$ attempting to use different subkeys $C_{K}$s to cheat honest participants into accepting a different conference key shall be removed from the set of participants.

**Lemma 2.** No honest participants shall be excluded from the set of participants.

We prove the Huang et al.’s [6] protocol not only leads to all participants obtaining different conference keys but also fails to achieve the **Lemma 2.**

IV. OUR IMPROVEMENT

To resist the modification attack, we propose an improvement on the Huang et al.’s [6] scheme in this section. Our improvement contains four phases: secret distribution and commitment phase, sub key computation and verification phase, fault detection phase, and conference key computation phase. The parameters used here are the same as the Huang et al.’s scheme [6]. Detailed steps of the proposed scheme are described as follows.

A. Secret Distribution and Commitment Phase

This phase is the same as that in the Huang et al.’s [6] protocol, each $U_i$ broadcast the message $M_i = \{ T, R_i, S_i, c_i, d_{i1}, d_{i2}, \ldots, d_{in} \}$ to other participants $U_j$. This phase is shown in Fig. 1.

B. Subkey Computation and Verification Phase

After receiving $M_i$, each participant $U_i$ executes the following steps and the detailed steps are described in Fig. 2.

Step 1. Check whether or not time stamp $T$ is valid.

Step 2. Compute the section key $k_{ij} = c_i^j \mod p \; q \leq j \leq n$ using $x_i$ and $c_i$.

Step 3. Calculate the subkey $C_{Kj}$:

\[ d_{ij} = d_{ij} \oplus k_{ij} \]

\[ C_{Kj} = d_{ij}^j c_{ij} \mod p \]

Step 4. Check the signature ($R_j$, $S_j$) by the following signature verification equation:

\[ g^{d_{ij}^j} = y_j^{(T_j) C_{ki}} R_j^{m_j} \mod p \]

Step 5. If steps 1-4 is satisfied, then $v_i$ = “success” otherwise $v_i$ = “failure” and then compute $h(k_{ij} || v_j)$.

Step 6. Broadcast $v_j$ and $h(k_{ij} || v_j)$. As compared with Huang et al.’s [6] protocol, our improvement provides message authentication.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$U_i$</th>
<th>$U(i\neq j)$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1. Variity $T$  
2. $k_{ij} = c_i^j \mod p \mod q \; 1 \leq j \leq n$  
3. $d_j = d_{j1} \oplus k_{ij}$  
$C_{Kj} = d_{j1} c_{ij} \mod q$  
4. $g^{d_{ij}^j} = y_j^{(T_j) C_{ki}} R_j^{m_j} \mod p$  
5. If Eq.4 is satisfied, $v_j$ = “success” otherwise $v_j$ = “failure”, compute $h(k_{ij} || v_j)$  
6. Broadcast $v_j$ and $h(k_{ij} || v_j)$  
\[ h(k_{ij} || v_j), v_j \]|
If the equation is satisfied, then start to execute the fault detection phase, or else, set \(U_i\) as a malicious participant. Later on, each participant waits for the fault detection message \(a_i\) and \(CK_i\) from \(U_i\). If no fault detection is received from \(U_i\), then set \(U_i\) as a malicious participant. This phase works as follows:

1. On receiving message \(a_i\) and \(CK_i\) from \(U_i\), each participant executes the following steps to detect fault.
   a. Compute \(c_j^m = g^{am}\), check whether \(c_j^m = c_j^{a_i}\);
   b. Check \(d_j\) by input \(a_i\) and \(CK_i\) into secret distribution and commitment phase steps 1-3.
   c. Check whether signature \((R_i, S)\) is correct made by \(U_i\). If all the steps are satisfied, set \(U_i\) as a malicious participant; otherwise, set \(U_i\) as a malicious one.
2. Remove all the malicious participants from \(U\) and restarts the protocol.

**D. Conference Key Computation Phase**

When the aforementioned process is executed until no more faults are detected, each honest participant of the set \(U' = \{U'_1, U'_2, ..., U'_n\}\) computes the conference key \(CK\), as follows:

\[
CK = (CK'_1 + CK'_2 + ... + CK'_n) \mod q
\]

**V. ANALYSIS OF OUR IMPROVEMENT**

In this section, we describe the security analysis of our improvement and compare performance with Huang et al.’s protocol. At first, we show an improved method against the modification attack as:

**A. Modification Attack**

Our improvement not only can resist impersonated attacks, replay attacks but also can resist the modification attack that we find in Huang et al.’s protocol.

According to the attack method in Section IIIA, we presume that \(E\) is the attacker who eavesdrops on the broadcast channel and tries to alter the exchanged messages in the sub key computation and verification phase. Assume \(E\) replaces \(v_j\) with \(v_j'\) and resend to \(U_j\). On receive \(v_j'\), \(h(k_j,v_j')\), \(U_j\) first computes \(h(k_j,v_j)\) and check \(h(k_j,v_j') = h(k_j,v_j)\). Thus attacker need to compute the session key \(k_{ij}\). However, to find \(k_{ij} = c_j^{a_i} \mod p\) is hard. First, he needs to come up with the private key \(x_i\) of user \(U_i\). To obtain \(x_i\) from \(v_i = g^{x_i}\) the attacker will have to solve the discrete logarithm problem. Therefore the modification attack cannot work in our improvement.

**B. Replay Attack**

The adversary might try to impersonate valid participants \(U_i\) to resend the message \(M_i\) in secret distribution and commitment phase. Since generated the message \(M\) for all conferences has a timestamp \(T\). As receiving the message \(M_i\) all the participants can verify the validity of the timestamp \(T\) from \(M_i\) and the signature verification equation. So replay attack can be avoided in our improvement.

**C. Performance**

In addition to security of the system, the efficiency of the protocol has been an important issue. In this section we compare with Huang et al.’s protocol [6]. The protocol of Huang et al. has been in comparison with the method of Tzeng that was declared efficient. The analysis of performance is partition into analysis of computation costs and transmission costs. Computation costs contain cost of secret distribution and commitment phase, subkey computation and verification phase and cost of executing fault detection. Transmission costs include the load of each participants broadcasted transmission message. The notation is as follows Table I.

Table II illustrates the comparison of the improvement and Huang et al. proposed protocol. The table shows that our improvement increased the one way hash function in subkey computation and verification phase and fault detection phase. However, our improvement is more secure than Huang et al.’s protocol. Since the proposed protocol suffers from modification attack, our improvement used message authentication code to resist modification attack.

Table III analyzes communication cost. Owing to used message authentication code, our improvement has a heavier cost of \(q\). Nevertheless, it can remedy Huang et al.’s protocol.

**VI. CONCLUSIONS**

In this paper, the security of a conference key agreement protocol with fault-tolerant capability by Huang et al. [6] is analyzed. The main idea of the protocol is the filtering of malicious participants at the beginning of the conference to ensure that all participants can obtain the same conference key.
However, we find that Huang et al.’s conference key agreement protocol is vulnerable to modification attack. It may result in other participants obtaining different conference keys and honest participants will be excluded from the set of participants. Thus, we propose an improvement to remedy Huang et al.’s weaknesses. The proposed improvement only requires one additional hash function, as we prove; our protocol can work against the proposed attack method.

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