The Effects of an Immigration Policy on the Economic Integration of Migrants and on Natives’ Attitudes: The Case of Syrian Refugees in Turkey

S. Zeynep Siretioglu Girgin, Gizem Turna Cebeci

Abstract—Turkey’s immigration policy is a controversial issue considering its legal, economic, social, and political and human rights dimensions. Formulation of an immigration policy goes hand in hand with political processes, where natives’ attitudes play a significant role. On the other hand, as was the case in Turkey, radical changes made in immigration policy or policies lacking transparency may cause severe reactions by the host society. The underlying discussion paper aims to analyze quantitatively the effects of the existing ‘open door’ immigration policy on the economic integration of Syrian refugees in Turkey, and on the perception of the native population of refugees. For the analysis, semi-structured in-depth interviews and focus group interviews have been conducted. After the introduction, a literature review is provided, followed by theoretical background on the explanation of natives’ attitudes towards immigrants. In the next section, a qualitative analysis of natives’ attitudes towards Syrian refugees is presented with the subtopics of (i) awareness, general opinions and expectations, (ii) open-door policy and management of the migration process, (iii) perception of positive and negative impacts of immigration, (iv) economic integration, and (v) cultural similarity. Results indicate that, natives concurrently have social, economic and security concerns regarding refugees, while difficulties regarding security and economic integration of refugees stand out. Socio-economic characteristics of the respondents, such as the educational level and employment status, are not sufficient to explain the overall attitudes towards refugees, while they can be used to explain the awareness of the respondents and the priority of the concerns felt.

Keywords—Economic integration, immigration policy, integration policies, migrants, natives’ attitudes, perception, Syrian refugees, Turkey.

I. INTRODUCTION

SINCE migration can have long-lasting effects, immigration policies generally stand at the center of public debate. Policies give priority to certain groups; such as family members of persons already residing in the host country, individuals having labor market characteristics matching current demands, or to certain ethnic groups. The choice of the immigration policy has implications on the skills composition of the migrants, the growth and performance of host country economy, and hence the attitudes of the host country population [1], [2].

Immigration policies preferring individuals with professional and language skills that reflect labor market demands, e.g. the Canadian point system, may facilitate the economic integration of newcomers. On the other hand, policies based on humanitarian criteria, such as the case of Syrian refugees in Turkey, may be more problematic in economic terms, since individuals are not ‘selected’ according to their professional and language capabilities. In this case, lack of transferable skills and greater difference between human capital of natives and immigrants make labor market assimilation as well as overall integration more difficult [1].

The choice of a particular policy can determine the group or groups who will benefit from migration. The belief that immigration has adverse impacts on wages and employment is prevalent in the public sphere. Although economic literature on the effects of immigration on wages and employment is controversial, most empirical research supports the view that immigration has a relatively small effect on the wages of native workers. Most empirical studies made for the United States as well as other countries conclude that a 10% increase in the share of immigrants in the population leads to maximally 1% decrease in native wages [3]. On the other hand, possible adverse fiscal impacts of immigration due to participation in social welfare programs by immigrants can also be of concern for host societies.

Natives’ attitudes on immigrants are also affected by the choice of policy. While natives in countries which receive mostly refugees, are more concerned with the ‘social’ impacts of immigration rather than the economic impacts; natives in countries receiving predominantly economic migrants, are concerned rather with the ‘economic’ effects. The most common explanations of natives’ attitudes towards immigrants are (i) economic self-interest or group-interest, (ii) cultural marginality theory [4], (iii) social interaction including the social contact hypothesis and social network theory [5], (iv) social identity theory including ‘in-group favoritism’ and ‘out-group prejudice’, (v) societal attachment, (vi) human capital differences, (vii) cultural values and beliefs, (viii) political affiliation, and (ix) safety or security [6].

Since the outbreak of the civil war in Syria in March 2011, Turkey has accepted high numbers of Syrian refugees within the framework of the principle of non-refoulement and an ‘open-door policy’. Thus, Turkey has given priority to migrants based on humanitarian criteria. Nevertheless, because of Turkey’s geographical limitation to the 1951
Refugee Convention, Syrians are not recognized as refugees but are formally ‘foreigners under temporary protection’.

According to UNDP data, the number of registered Syrian refugees is almost 3 million, while 51.9% are in legal working age. Until the issuance of the Regulation on the work permit of Refugees under Temporary Protection in 2016, the existence of Syrians has caused a supply shock to informal labor. Because of this supply shock, natives in the informal sector were displaced largely, while formal employment of natives increased. However, as found by Del Carpio and Wagner, the increase in formal employment mainly affected men without high school education. Women and high-skilled persons, on the contrary, could not benefit from the lower costs of the informal labor. There was a net displacement of women and the low-educated from the labor market, while they suffered from declining wages [7].

In this paper, we examine the effects of the open-door policy on refugees’ economic integration and on natives’ attitudes. The second chapter reviews the literature on Turkish natives’ attitudes. The third chapter gives a theoretical background on the explanation of natives’ attitudes toward immigrants. Following the approach and methodology of the study, we illustrate the results of the analysis, and relate them to the theories explaining natives’ attitudes. The final chapter concludes and gives recommendations.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

Web of Science search renders that only a few studies were made on Turkish natives’ perceptions of Syrians. Ergin made a qualitative study on Turkish university students’ perceptions towards their Syrian colleagues, and concluded that despite having concerns about Syrians’ access to higher education institutions; Turkish students support their participation in the classes [8].

Lazarev and Sharma conducted a survey experiment in order to see if religious identity can reduce individual-level prejudice toward refugees. They tested the independent as well as interdependent effects of the Muslim or Sunni identity, which Turks and Syrians share, and of the economic costs of immigration on the reduction of prejudice. The authors concluded that while due to the Muslim prime respondents’ charitable donations to Syrian refugees increased more, the Sunni prime was powerful in reducing the overall out-group prejudice. Moreover, simultaneous exposure to information on the economic consequences of the matter led to the reduction of prejudice. Moreover, simultaneous exposure to information on the economic consequences of the matter led to the reduction of prejudice

Kavakli et al. conducted a project on perceptions and attitudes towards Syrian refugees in Turkey. They used a mixed method consisting of surveys with 1,224 people including focus groups from different socio-economic groups residing in Istanbul, in-depth interviews with local public institutions and NGOs, and media content analysis for the period between 2011 and 2016. They found that a very high share of Turks have negative perceptions and attitudes. Their research findings were grouped in economic, security, moral degeneration – cultural backwardness, social cohesion and citizenship concerns, and were followed by policy recommendations [10].

Based on results of the Eurostat Perception Survey, Dusundere and Cilingir indicated that natives living in Turkey’s big cities Istanbul and Ankara have more negative judgments on foreigners’ integration (than those in Antalya and Diyarbakir), with 64% of Istanbulites thinking that foreigners fail to integrate in city life. Moreover, Istanbul has faced the most radical change in perceptions towards immigrants. While the share of natives thinking that foreigners could not integrate to city life was 9.3% in 2006, this rate has increased to 40% in 2015. Concurrently, in Istanbul and Ankara negative perceptions towards the existence of foreigners have increased [11], [12].

Erdogan and Unver contributed to the literature with their research on the perspectives, expectations and suggestions of the Turkish business sector on Syrians in Turkey. The study, conducted in collaboration with the Turkish Confederation of Employer Associations, covered semi-structured in-depth interviews with 134 business people from 18 provinces of the country and concluded with policy suggestions [13].

The underlying paper contributes to the literature by providing a qualitative analysis of Turkish natives’ attitudes towards Syrian refugees. It examines the antecedents of individuals’ attitudes and relates them to the prevalent theories of attitude formation.

III. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND ON THE EXPLANATION OF NATIVES’ ATTITUDES TOWARD IMMIGRANTS

Berg classifies the theories explaining natives’ attitudes in five categories: personal and social identity, self and group interest, cultural values and beliefs, social interaction, and multilevel theories [5]. We follow the same classification in this section.

A. Personal and Social Identity

While some scholars have concentrated on individuals’ identity, e.g. authoritarian personality, in order to assess their attitudes [14], others have focused on social identity. The social identity theory states that people form mental in-groups and out-groups. When a group identity is stimulated, people aim to “enhance the evaluation of the in-group relative to the out-group” and hence to improve their own self-evaluation [15].

Racial identity, ethnic background and political (party) affiliation are other characteristics used to explain individuals’ attitudes toward immigrants [5]. Individuals may be following group-oriented values. Political affiliation – whether a person is interested/involved in politics as well as his/her political orientation – is another factor, which can explain attitudes toward immigrants. Involvement in politics can be correlated with higher education and citizenship consciousness.

In many European countries, e.g. Austria and France, right-wing parties support stricter immigration control, and gain large public support. On the contrary, it was a right-wing party in Turkey, which decided to pursue an open-door immigration policy. An exploration of the connection between the personal
political leaning and attitudes toward immigrants would be interesting but is out of the scope of this paper.

The explanation based on societal attachment focuses on interpersonal trust. If their interpersonal trust toward people from different ethnic backgrounds is lower, natives may ‘blame’ immigrants for societal problems such as higher crime or unemployment rates [6], even if the latter are not the primary sources of the problems. In this sense, the level of interpersonal trust as well as having a family or children may (negatively) affect natives’ attitudes toward immigrants.

Attitudes of individuals toward immigrants are also closely related with their educational attainment. A number of studies find a positive impact of education on pro-immigrant attitudes [16], [17], [6]. Hainmueller and Hiscox conclude, “The connection between the educational or skill attributes of individuals and their views about immigration appears to have very little, if anything, to do with fears about labor-market competition. (...) Respondents that are more educated are significantly less racist and place greater value on cultural diversity; they are also more likely to believe that immigration generates benefits for the host economy as a whole” [17]. Similarly, Gang et al. find that education is a ‘strong antidote’ to anti-immigrant attitudes. [18]

B. Self and Group Interest

The economic self-interest approach, called ‘labor market competition hypothesis’ by Espenshade, suggests that natives’ political attitudes reflect on the first line their economic interests [19]. Those who feel that they will be economically disproportionally harmed through immigration, e.g. individuals with lower levels of education or with lower income, are more likely to have negative attitudes toward immigration [4]. On the individual level, lower-skilled people will perceive that lower-skilled immigrants are in ‘economic competition’ with them [6].

The competitive threat or group threat approach holds that the majority group believes that the minority group takes their finite resources, feels threatened by the minority group and develops negative attitudes towards them in response [5], [20]. According to the realistic conflict approach, the competition between the two groups for finite resources is legitimate. According to the perceived threat approach, on the other hand, intergroup conflict is perceived irrespective of the reality of economic competition and results in the formation of negative attitudes. [5] Furthermore, individuals may have a preferential hierarchy, meaning that they prefer some minority (immigrant) groups to others.

Effects of immigration on security may cause or increase anti-immigrant attitudes. Security has multiple dimensions such as economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security [21], of which we exclude food and environmental security in this paper. Economic security is often associated with insured basic income, insured employment, and access to social security services. Health security contains many issues including access to health services and prevention of diseases among others. Community security is defined as the “conservation of traditions, cultures, and commonly held values”. Lastly, political security covers the protection of human rights and the safety of people. The existence of especially undocumented migrants can cause a perception of decreased (economic, health, personal, political) security and to negative sentiments toward immigrants.

C. Cultural Values and Beliefs

The symbolic politics model yields that individuals’ attitudes in their adulthood are consistent with the latent political values they have acquired during their youth [22]. Political symbols trigger emotional reactions by individuals rather than rational thoughts [23], [5]. Political party articulation can affect attitudes toward immigrants, as Bohman has shown for 26 European countries [5], [24]. Sides and Citrin found in their analysis comprising 20 European countries that “symbolic predispositions, such as preferences for cultural unity, have a stronger statistical effect than economic dissatisfaction” [25]. Furthermore, the existence of group threat is likely to increase the (negative) effects of symbolic politics [5], [26].

Cultural stereotypes, symbolic racism and subtle prejudice further contribute to the formation of negative sentiments. The symbolic racism theory, similar to symbolic politics, implies that natives hold latent negative sentiments toward immigrants, “and once they are confronted by particular politically charged symbols, their negative feelings emerge and lead them to oppose immigrant-friendly public policies” [27], [5], [28]. Subtle prejudice, on the other hand, is defined by a combination of “a strong desire to defend traditional values, a tendency to exaggerate cultural differences, (…) and a cool to non-existent emotional response toward minorities and immigrants” [5].

As cultural values can negatively affect natives’ attitudes toward immigrants, they can also have positive impacts. For instance, a ‘cosmopolitanism worldview’ of individuals with higher socioeconomic status can explain positive attitudes [29]. Similarly, sharing the same religious ideology may lead to positive attitudes.

Another theory falling in this category is the cultural marginality theory. It implies that “membership of a marginalized oppressed or discriminated-against group not only increases sympathy for immigrants but also accentuates xenophobia” [4].

D. Social Interaction

The social contact theory suggests that “when people come in contact with immigrants over time in a casual manner, without really developing intimate relationships or friendships; they develop suspicion and hostility, which would lead to higher anti-immigrant attitudes” [6], [30]. On the other hand, interaction can reduce misconceptions and prejudice.

E. Multilevel Theories

Finally yet importantly, Blumer’s group position theory of prejudice is one of the multilevel theories, since it encompasses social psychological as well as contextual elements [5], [31]. According to Blumer, members of the majority group share (i) a feeling of superiority, (ii) a feeling
that the minority group is ‘intrinsically different and alien’, (iii) a sense of privilege over certain rights and resources, (iv) a perception of threat from the minority group who might claim a larger share of the majority group’s prerogatives [5], [31]. The approach involves individual-level factors such as “group identity, out-group stereotyping, preferred group status and perceived threat”, contextual level factors and historical processes including political developments and role of the media [5], [31].

IV. APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY

### TABLE I

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#### TABLE II

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The numbers in parenthesis are the question numbers as in the Questionnaire.

We have been conducting semi-structured in-depth interviews with 19 and focus group interviews with 12 respondents residing in Istanbul. One of the focus groups included seven university assistants and associate professors, the other one mainly housewives. The rather lower income of the respondents despite higher education levels can be explained with the fact that a high number of academicians have been interviewed. The demographic and socio-economic characteristics of the participants are illustrated in Table I.

The demographic and socio-economic characteristics of the participants are illustrated in Table I.

For the analysis, we grouped the interview questions under five categories: (i) awareness, general opinion and expectations; (ii) open-door policy and management of the migration process, (iii) perception of positive and negative impacts of immigration, (iv) cultural similarity, and (v) economic integration. During the analysis, we related the findings with the theories found in literature (Section III). We observed that natives’ attitudes can best be explained through a multi-level theory containing individual-level factors and contextual-level factors such as historical processes. Table II illustrates the theories and related questions in the political, social, cultural and economic contexts.

V. MAIN FINDINGS

**A. Awareness, General Opinion and Expectations**

In order to determine the respondents’ awareness on the subject, we asked them the numbers of Syrians residing in Turkey and Istanbul, respectively. The majority made good predictions about the current nationwide numbers, while they overestimated the Syrian population in Istanbul.

The general opinion of the respondents is that from a humanitarian perspective, the open-door policy was a fair one; however, looking from its economic, social and political aspects, the issue is more complicated. Although they consider the policy just, all of them agreed that the number of immigrants Turkey has received was not manageable because of the country’s scarce resources. The respondents agreed that the living standards of Syrians in Turkey, both in camps and in cities, were very low.

The majority of natives stated that it would be unrealistic to expect Syrians to return to their country even when the war ends. Only few respondents believe that refugees will return to their home country. These argue that the young and/or those who can achieve higher living standards would stay. More educated respondents among those, who believe that Syrians will be permanent in Turkey, think they actually should stay in the long-term. This result is in accordance with empirical findings on the positive impact of education on pro-immigrant attitudes.

It is remarkable that the majority of the respondents holding anti-immigrant attitudes were female and mother. This situation may be explained with the theory on societal attachment, which states that having a family or children may negatively affect attitudes toward immigrants.

Most of the respondents were of the opinion that refugees should live in those geographical regions where they can be productive. The answers on the question where Syrians should continue living were split between rural and urban areas. Some argued that farmers and stock-farmers should live in rural areas so that they can use their skills and those places can economically flourish.
B. Open-Door Policy and Management of the Migration Process

There was consensus among respondents that the whole migration process was managed poorly. They have underlined the necessity of registration, control and plan due to security and economic concerns, respectively. Although the open-door policy by itself was the ‘right’ policy, many problems occurred on the provision of minimum living standards due to the high number of refugees and scarce economic resources. Hence, there should have been a fair distribution of refugees among a higher number of countries.

Some respondents suggested that the management of the process as well as the transmission of social services could have been easier if Syrians were residing more collectively, for instance in a buffer zone. On the other hand, others suggested that accumulation of Syrians in camps or other closed areas could lead to a ghettoization. However, it is desirable that they socially, economically and politically integrate to the host society.

We observed symbolic politics and subtle prejudice in the attitudes of the respondents. They perceive the increase of the Arabic population as a potential threat to the secular character of the Turkish state. The belief that the granting of Turkish citizenship to Syrians may change the political balances in Turkey, leads to the emergence of negative sentiments of natives. A high share of the respondents considers Turkish citizenship should not be granted to all Syrians.

Notwithstanding, almost half of the respondents proposed the granting of citizenship under certain conditions, such as having matching skills in the labor force, a certain level of income and language proficiency. Moreover, there is a common opinion that refugees are used as a foreign policy tool during the negotiations with the European Union, which causes negative attitudes.

C. Perception of Positive and Negative Impacts of Immigration

A high share of the respondents stated they could not recognize any positive impacts of the Syrian immigration. The reason behind this may be that the economic concerns outweigh so that their overall opinion is negative. On the other hand, the most commonly mentioned positive impacts were cultural richness and economic benefits (cheap labor and competitive advantage).

The educational level of respondents who stated that there were positive impacts was higher. They pointed out that the positive impacts may increase with time and when the two societies interact more. For instance, there may be more cultural exchange when migrants learn the native language. The social contact theory also holds that interaction reduces misconceptions and prejudice.

The most commonly mentioned negative effects were social, security and economic. When asked to sort their concerns in a hierarchical order, respondents mentioned most frequently either the economic effects or the security concerns in the first place. Only a few did not mention security problems in their ranking. Table III lists the concerns of the individual participants and of the focus groups. Social impacts included mainly problems resulting from cultural differences and lack of integration. The major security concerns were increase in contagious diseases (health security), terrorism and crime rates (political security/safety). The economic concerns were the increase in the unemployment rates of natives due to cheap immigrant labor supply, and the negative effects of shadow employment of Syrians.

It is worth to point out that respondents did not mention at all that work permits were granted as late as five years after the start of Syrian mass migration. Maybe for that reason, high-skilled natives did not actually feel an economic threat. Moreover, employers took advantage of cheap labor supply. It was mainly the low skilled who perceived and expressed an economic threat.

D. Economic Integration

The vast majority of the participants share the opinion that Syrians should be integrated in the economy by granting work permits. Opposing participants explained their attitude with high unemployment rates among the natives, especially the young. Since Syrians have been working without social insurance and for lower wages than Turks, some employers have preferred the former. This situation led to perceived threat (due to economic competition) by lower-skilled natives and can also be related to in-group favoritism. On the other hand, self-employed natives perceived some governmental applications such as tax exemption for Syrian businesses unfair. As an example, while natives offer goods for certain prices, Syrians can offer the same goods for lower prices. This was also a perceived economic threat.

The main view on the shadow employment was that the economic impacts are independent from the nationality of employees. Thus, the majority of the respondents state that the government should audit the labor market efficiently in order to prevent shadow employment, including child employment. However, employers may prefer shadow employment due to the bureaucratic difficulties of getting work permits and higher costs, such as fees and insurance premiums. Similarly, Syrian employees may be willing to work for lower wages to escape the bureaucratic procedures and have comparative advantage.

E. Cultural Similarity

About a third of the individual respondents, and most of the respondents in the focus groups were of the opinion that Syrians are culturally similar to Turks, in terms of cuisine, religion and regional similarity (Mediterranean or Middle Eastern culture). Participants in the focus group associated the Syrian culture with the Southeastern Anatolian culture.

On the other hand, a few participants stated that culture should not be reduced to religion. They emphasized differences in the historical backgrounds between the two countries, as well as differences between the life style and language of the two societies. Because of language and racial similarity, they feel more similar to Turkic countries. Both in response to questions regarding cultural similarity and political effects, we observed negative sentiments to the
proliferation of Arabic culture in Turkey. Cultural stereotypes such as family life and women’s traditional role, may have affected natives’ attitudes.

VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The overall attitude of natives is that from a humanitarian perspective, the open-door policy was a fair policy; however, from economic, social and political sides the issue is more complex. It can be deducted that natives’ attitudes turn to negative owing to the large number of Syrians Turkey has received and to the potential political effects of granting Turkish citizenship. The majority believes that they will stay permanently in Turkey. To reduce negative attitudes of natives, citizenship can be granted gradually, starting with rights to social services and residence permit. After a certain time of residence, citizenship can be given under well-defined conditions, e.g. acquisition of language skills.

All respondents agreed that the migration process was poorly managed because of scarce economic resources and infrastructural inadequacies. For being able to provide better living standards to the refugees, there should have been a fair distribution among many countries.

There were mentioned more negative than positive impacts of immigration. Since the interaction between the two societies is limited because of lack of Syrians’ integration, positive impacts seem not to be perceived yet. On the other hand, the most common negative effects can be classified in social, security and economic effects.

Concerning the economic integration of Syrians, the outstanding problems were shadow employment, lower wages of refugees and child labor. To eliminate these problems, the auditing mechanism should work more efficiently. As a matter of fact, the problems of shadow employment and child labor do not only concern refugees but are a general matter that needs to be solved.

Some natives find that the two societies share several cultural similarities. These can become more visible if the societies interact more. As Allport implied, positive effects of intergroup contact occurs when both societies have equal group status, common goals, intergroup cooperation to achieve common goals, and support of authorities [5], [32], [33]. This would improve the integration of Syrian refugees.

At this point, non-governmental organizations might be supportive in integrating Syrians to the host society. Since the refugee population is very high, they can only play a supplementary role to the state in dealing with the major problems. NGOs can reduce prejudice by informing the host society on migration issues, provide education and training for Syrians in order to integrate them to the social as well as economic environment, and help with children’s education in order to prevent the loss of a generation. Language training is one of the areas where they can be very effective.

Last but not least, the power of the self-perception of refugees and the discrimination by natives can interact and produce negative outcomes such as ghettoization, and hampering social as well as economic integration. In order to prevent such a situation, along with NGOs, the media can play an active role in the reduction of subtle prejudice. Messages of prominent people can have great impact on the society’s attitudes. For all kinds of support to be successful, it is essential to ensure sustainability.

For future research, it would be useful to do the survey with a larger sample size and to include individuals from professions such as teachers, religious functionaries and public servants. Moreover, it would be interesting to incorporate questions to explore the relations between natives’ attitudes and their political views.

APPENDIX: QUESTIONNAIRE

1. a. What is the number of Syrian refugees residing in Turkey?
   b. What is the number of Syrian refugees residing in Istanbul?
2. What are your general opinion about and expectations of Syrian refugees?
3. Do you think that they will return to their countries when the war in Syria ends?
4. If the current political situation (in Syria) persists, where and how should the Syrian refugees reside in Turkey?
5. What are the positive impacts of Syrians on Turkish society? Do you think that Syrians are culturally similar to Turks? Which culture would you consider most similar to the Turkish culture?
6. What are the negative impacts of Syrians on the Turkish society?
7. Do you think that the migration process has been managed well?
   a. If not, which mistakes have been made?
   b. Do you think that the ‘Open-door Policy’ was a good policy to be applied?
8. a. What are the problems you perceive that result from the existence of Syrian refugees?
   b. (If the respondent names more than one problem) Would you please rank the problems from the most important to the least important?
9. How is the employment situation in Turkey in general and in your sector?
10. How do you evaluate the migrant labor supply taking into account the employment situation in Turkey?
11. What are the impacts of the shadow employment of Syrians on the economy?
12. Do you think that Syrian refugees should be granted work permit?
   a. If yes, in which sectors/under which circumstances?
   b. If not, why? Which are your considerations?
13. In which sectors would the employment of migrants be more productive?
14. What should be done for the economic integration of Syrians in Turkey?
15. Do you think that Syrians residing in Turkey do or will cause security problems? If yes, in which areas?
16. What are the political impacts of the existence of Syrian refugees?
17. Do you think that Syrians should be granted Turkish
citizenship?

a. If they are granted citizenship, do you think that the political balance in Turkey would change?

18. What can/should non-governmental organizations in Turkey do for the Syrian refugees?

19. Is there anything you would like to add to your responses?

### Table III

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### REFERENCES


