A Two-Channel Secure Communication Using Fractional Chaotic Systems

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Abstract—In this paper, a two-channel secure communication using fractional chaotic systems is presented. Conditions for chaos synchronization have been investigated theoretically by using Laplace transform. To illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed scheme, a numerical example is presented. The keys, key space, key selection rules and sensitivity to keys are discussed in detail. Results show that the original plaintexts have been well masked in the ciphertexts yet recovered faithfully and efficiently by the present schemes.

Keywords—fractional chaotic systems, synchronization, secure communication.

I. INTRODUCTION

Since the work of Lorenz [1], chaos theory has stimulated intense attentions in recent decades. The random-like behavior of chaotic signals provides the potential for many applications. Among them, the introduction of chaos into secure communication has received a great deal of attentions after the pioneering work of Fujisaka & Yamada [2] and Pecora & Carroll [3]. With chaos-based encryption, a message is encrypted by a master chaotic signal at the transmitter. At the receiver end, a slave chaotic signal synchronized with the master one is necessary to retrieve the message signal. In recent years, a growing number of cryptosystems based on chaos synchronization have been proposed [4]. Many of them fundamentally are flawed by a lack of robustness and security.

In order to enhance the security levels, two-channel chaos-based cryptosystems are proposed [5, 6]. In these cryptosystems the ciphertext consists of a complex nonlinear combination of the plaintext and a variable of a chaotic transmitter’s generator. Since it was not possible to synchronize the slave system with such ciphertext, a second channel had to be used in the system for transmitting synchronization signal. The synchronization signal was a different chaotic variable generated by the master system, which was transmitted to the receiver without any modification and does not contain any information of the plaintexts. These schemes are free to attacks if only ciphertext is intercepted by the intruder. However, if the synchronization signal is also intercepted, those schemes have been found to be insecure by Orue et al.[7] because parameter estimation is still possible by analyzing the chaos synchronization channel.

Chaotic attractors have been found in fractional order system in the past decade [8-15]. Compared to integer order system, it is found that the dynamics of fractional order system are more complexity because fractional derivatives have complex geometrical interpretation because of their non-local character [16] and high nonlinearity. Another advantage of using fractional chaotic systems in communication is that the derivative orders can be used as secret keys as well. Kiani et al. [17] proposed a secure communication using fractional chaotic systems based on extended fractional Kalman filter. In this manuscript, we proposed a modification of the two-channel chaos-based cryptosystems by using fractional chaotic systems to increase the security level of communication.

II. FRACTIONAL DERIVATIVES

There are several definitions of fractional derivatives [18]. In this study, we use the Caputo-type fractional derivative defined by [19]:

\[
\frac{d^\alpha y}{dt^\alpha} = D^\alpha y(t) = J^{\alpha-m} y^{(m)}(t), \quad \alpha > 0,
\]

where \( m = [\alpha] \) is the value \( \alpha \) rounded up to the nearest integer, \( y^{(m)} \) is the ordinary \( m^{th} \) derivative of \( y \), and

\[
J^\beta y(t) = \frac{1}{\Gamma(\beta)} \int_{0}^{t} (t-\tau)^{\beta-1} y(\tau)d\tau
\]

is the Riemann–Liouville integral operator of order \( \beta > 0 \), where \( \Gamma(\beta) \) is the gamma function.

III. SYNCHRONIZATION BETWEEN TWO FRACTIONAL LORENZ SYSTEMS BY SINGLE VARIABLE

The fractional Lorenz system is given by
where \( \alpha_i, \beta_i, \gamma_i \) are the fractional orders, \((a, b, c)\) are parameters of this system. It has been shown that the fractional Lorenz system exhibits chaotic attractor. The first signal \( x_i(t) \) of system (3) is chosen as synchronization signal to drive another Lorenz system

\[
\begin{align*}
D^\alpha x_1 &= a(x_2 - x_1) \\
D^\alpha y_1 &= a(y_2 - y_1) \\
D^\alpha z_1 &= x_1 x_2 - cx_1
\end{align*}
\]

Systems (3) and (4) are called the master and slave systems, respectively. It is noted that the subsystem \( (y_2, y_3) \) is dependent on the signal \( x_i(t) \), but the behavior is not influenced by the behavior of \( x_i(t) \) and \( x_i(t) \).

Synchronization means the trajectories of one of the systems will converge to the same values of the other. Define the state errors between the master and slave system as \( e_1 = x_1 - y_1, e_2 = x_2 - y_2, e_3 = x_3 - y_3 \). Subtracting system (3) by \( x_1 \) to \( x_3 \) respectively. It is noted that the subsystem \( y_2(,) \) is dependent on the signal \( x_1(t) \), but the behavior is not influenced by the behavior of \( x_1(t) \) and \( x_1(t) \).

By taking Laplace transform of both side of system (5), Let \( E_i(s) = L[x_i(t)] \) where \( i=1,2,3 \), and applying \( L[d^{\alpha}e_i/dt] = s^\alpha E_i(s) - s^{\alpha-1}e_i(0) \), we obtain

\[
\begin{align*}
&\frac{s^\alpha E_1(s) - s^{\alpha-1}e_1(0)}{s^{\alpha} + a} = a[E_2(s) - E_1(s)] \\
&\frac{s^\alpha E_2(s) - s^{\alpha-1}e_2(0)}{s^{\alpha} + b} = -L[x_1e_1] - E_2(s) \\
&\frac{s^\alpha E_3(s) - s^{\alpha-1}e_3(0)}{s^{\alpha} + c} = x_1e_1 - cE_3(s)
\end{align*}
\]

**Proposition:** If \( E_i(s), E_j(s) \) are bounded, then the master and slave systems will be synchronized.

**Proof:** Rewrite (6) as follows,

\[
\begin{align*}
E_1(s) &= \frac{aE_2(s)}{s^{\alpha} + a} + \frac{s^{\alpha-1}e_1(0)}{s^{\alpha} + a} \\
E_2(s) &= \frac{-L[x_1e_1]}{s^{\alpha} + b} + \frac{s^{\alpha-1}e_2(0)}{s^{\alpha} + b} \\
E_3(s) &= \frac{L[x_1e_1]}{s^{\alpha} + c} + \frac{s^{\alpha-1}e_3(0)}{s^{\alpha} + c}
\end{align*}
\]

Using the final value theorem of Laplace transform, it follows that

\[
\begin{align*}
&\lim_{t \to \infty} e_1(t) = \lim_{s \to 0^+} sE_1(s) = \lim_{s \to 0^+} sE_2(s) = \lim_{s \to 0^+} sE_3(s) \\
&\lim_{t \to \infty} e_2(t) = \lim_{s \to 0^+} L[x_1e_1] \\
&\lim_{t \to \infty} e_3(t) = \lim_{s \to 0^+} sL[x_1e_1] = \frac{1}{c} \lim_{s \to 0^+} sL[x_1e_1]
\end{align*}
\]

Since \( E_i(s), E_j(s) \) are bounded, we have \( \lim_{t \to \infty} e_i(t) = \lim_{s \to 0^+} E_i(s) = 0 \). Now, owing to the attractiveness of the attractors of system (3) and (4), there exists \( \eta > 0 \) such that \( |x_i(t)| \leq \eta < \infty \). \( |y_i(t)| \leq \eta < \infty \) where \( i \) refers to the index of the master or slave variables. Therefore, \( \lim_{t \to \infty} e_i(t) = 0 \). This implies that

\[
\lim_{t \to \infty} e_i(t) = 0, \quad i = 1, 2, 3
\]

Consequently, the synchronization between the master and slave systems (3) and (4) is achieved.

**IV. PROPOSED SCHEME OF SECURE COMMUNICATION**

Fig. 1 illustrates the overall architecture of a secure communication scheme with two transmission channels. In the encryption step, we use a highly nonlinear function \( \phi \) to encrypt the plaintexts \( S(t) \) with the chaotic signals \( x_i(t) \). The ciphertexts \( T_i(t) \) are transmitted to the receiver. In the second step, we transmit the synchronization signal \( x_i(t) \) in a separate channel to the receiver. In this channel, \( x_i(t) \) is used for synchronization and does not contain any information of the plaintexts.

![Fig. 1 Architecture of the secure communication scheme](image-url)
V. ANALYSIS

A. Numerical results

In this section, we present simulation results to demonstrate the efficiency of our new secure communication scheme. An efficient method for solving fractional order differential equations is the predictor corrector scheme or more precisely, PECE (Predict, Evaluate, Correct, Evaluate) technique. The detailed algorithm of the scheme was developed by Diethelm et al. [20]. The scheme has been adopted to simulate the fractional chaotic system in many researches [11, 14, 17]. It is used throughout this paper.

The following choices of fractional orders, parameters and initial conditions for the master and slave systems were selected for simulations:

\[(\alpha, \omega, \mu) = (0.96, 0.98, 1.1)\]
\[(a, b, c) = (10, 28, 8/3)\]
\[x(0), x_2(0), x_3(0)] = [-1, -2, 5]\]
\[y(0), y_2(0), y_3(0)] = [1, 2, 1]\]

(10)

The encryption/decryption pairs, \(\psi(\bullet)\) and \(\phi(\bullet)\), can be chosen according to different system demands for higher security/privacy. In this work, we follow the work of [5] and take the encryption and decryption functions to be

\[\psi(\bullet) = x_1^2(t) + (1 + x_2^2(t)) S(t)\]
\[\phi(\bullet) = -\frac{y_2^2(t)}{1 + y_2^2(t)} + \frac{T_1(t)}{1 + y_2^2(t)}\]  

(11)

The following simulation, a total simulation time of 40 seconds with 10000 time steps was used. The sampling frequency was 250 Hz. A sinusoidal signal with a frequency of 2 Hz was used as the plaintext signal, \(S(t) = 0.05 \sin(4\pi t)\). Fig. 2 shows the synchronization between fractional master and slave systems. It is shown that two fractional systems have been synchronized. Fig. 3 shows the ciphertexts through the channels. With nonlinear mix of plaintexts and chaotic signal, it’s impossible to obtain the useful plaintexts from the ciphertexts.

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The decrypted plaintexts in the initial time stage are clipped to scale of the vertical axis in this figure. The plaintexts are recovered with errors during the initial synchronization time. However, the error of recovery, \(E(t) = S(t) - S_e(t)\), approaches zero very quickly. The initial synchronization time was estimated to be about 4 seconds.

Fig. 2. The response and synchronization of master and slave system.

Fig. 3 ciphertexts \(T_i(t)\) through the channel
After the initial synchronization time, the plaintexts can be successfully recovered as shown in Fig. 4.

**B. Keys, key space, selection rules of keys and sensitivity**

In the present scheme, the encryption signals, $x_i(t)$, are generated from the fractional Lorenz system with fractional derivative orders $(\alpha_x,\alpha_y,\alpha_z)$ and the parameters $(a,b,c)$. The fractional derivative orders can be used as secret keys as well. Hence, the secret key consists of six numbers $(\alpha_x,\alpha_y,\alpha_z, a, b, c)$. Since these six numbers could be real numbers, the space of the keys will be a 6-dimensional space. The space is nonlinear since all of the keys are not equally strong. In the subspace where the fractional derivative orders or parameters of the fractional Lorenz system originate periodic orbits, the sub-key space is degenerative because it is relatively easy to break. Values of $(\alpha_x,\alpha_y,\alpha_z, a, b, c)$ which give rise to periodic windows should be avoided since chaotic bands are preferred for encryption.

The security of chaos-based cryptosystems relies on the secret key consisting of the chaotic system’s parameters and/or some other complementary parameters that control how the plaintext is included. Hence, finding the parameters is equivalent to breaking the system. The two-channel secure communication proposed by Jiang [5] has been broken by [7] because the parameters of integer Lorenz chaotic system can be estimated by simply geometrical properties. In our scheme, as fractional derivative order are also regarded as keys, the breaking method described by Orue et al. [7] are not effective because estimation of fractional derivative orders is not possible in their method.

Next, we demonstrate the sensitivity of our communication system to keys. Consider an intruder intercept both the ciphertexts and synchronization signals. Assume the intruder get an approximate estimate of keys, say $(\alpha_x,\alpha_y,\alpha_z, a, b, c) = (0.96,0.97,1.1,1.0, 28,8/3)$ in which there is a slight mismatch with the real keys in $\alpha_z$.

**VI. CONCLUSIONS**

In this paper chaos synchronization between two fractional Lorenz systems by using single variable has been studied. Conditions for chaos synchronization have been investigated theoretically by using Laplace transform. A two-channel communication scheme using the fractional Lorenz systems has been presented. With usage of fractional derivative order as the keys, the key space is expanded and guarantees higher security.

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