Comments on He et al.’s robust biometric-based user authentication scheme for WSNs

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Abstract—In order to guarantee secure communication for wireless sensor networks (WSNs), many user authentication schemes have successfully drawn researchers’ attention and been studied widely. In 2012, He et al. proposed a robust biometric-based user authentication scheme for WSNs. However, this paper demonstrates that He et al.’s scheme has some drawbacks: poor reparable problem, user impersonation attack, and sensor node impersonate attack.

Keywords—Security, authentication, biometrics, poor reparable, impersonation attack, wireless sensor networks.

I. INTRODUCTION

RECENTLY, wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have received a huge attention due to their promising applications in a variety of areas such as real-time traffic monitoring, measurement of seismic activity, wildlife monitoring and so on. In WSN, a large number of highly resource-constrained sensor nodes deployed to collect data or events in a specified geographic area[1]. In order to protect the important data and to prevent non-authorized users from gaining profit from the data, user authentication scheme should be offered[2], [3].

In 2010, Yuan et al.[4] proposed a biometric-based user authentication scheme for WSNs. Biometric keys can be a solution to solve the above security problems, which are based on physiological or behavioral characteristics of persons, such as fingerprints, faces, irises, and so on [5], [6], [7], [8], [9]. However, Yoon et al.[7] pointed out that Yuan et al.’s scheme is vulnerable to the insider attack, user impersonation attack, GW-node impersonation attack and sensor node impersonate attack. To improve security, Yoon et al.’ proposed an improved scheme that can withstand various attacks. In 2012, He et al.[10], however, pointed out that Yoon et al.’s scheme is still vulnerable to the denial-of-service attack (DoS) and the sensor node impersonation attack and then proposed another improved scheme to overcome the weaknesses in Yoon et al.’s scheme. Nevertheless, this paper pointed out that He et al.’s scheme also has some drawbacks: poor reparable problem [11], [12], [13], [14], user impersonation attack, and sensor node impersonate attack [15].

This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews He et al.’s scheme and then shows the security problems of the He et al.'s scheme in Section 3. Our conclusions are presented in Section 4.

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II. REVIEW OF HE ET AL.’S SCHEME

This section briefly reviews He et al.’s scheme [10]. The scheme includes three phases: registration, login, and authentication. The following notations are used throughout this paper.

- $U_i$: the $i$-th user;
- $ID_i$, $PW_i$, $B_i$: Identity, password, and biometric template of $U_i$, respectively;
- $GW-node$: Gateway node of WSN;
- $x$, $y$: two master keys of GW-node;
- $S_j$: the $j$-th sensor node;
- $SID_j$: $S_j$ identity;
- $d(\cdot)$: symmetric parametric function;
- $\tau$: predetermined threshold for biometric verification;
- $E_k(\cdot)$: a symmetric encryption function with key $k$;
- $D_k(\cdot)$: the decryption function corresponding to $E_k(\cdot)$;
- $h(\cdot)$: Secure one-way hash function [16];
- $\oplus$: bit-wise exclusive-or(XOR) operation;
- $\|$: concatenation of messages.

In order to execute He et al.’s framework, He et al. considered that the gateway is a trusted node and it hold two master keys ($x$ and $y$), which are sufficiently large for the sensor network. Before starting the system, it is assumed that a long-term secret key $h(SID_j\|y)$ generated by gateway is stored in sensor node $S_j$ before the node is deployed, where $SID_j$ is the identity of $S_j$.

A. Registration Phase

When a user $U_i$ wants to register and become a new legal user, as shown in Fig. 1, the following steps are performed during the user registration phase.

Step 1. $U_i \rightarrow GW-node$: $\{ID_i, h(PW_i\|B_i\|b_i), B_i\}$ $U_i$ generates a random number $b_i$, freely chooses his/her identity $ID_i$, password $PW_i$, and also imprints his/her personal biometric impression $B_i$ at the sensor. $U_i$ then interactively submits $ID_i$, $h(PW_i\|B_i\|b_i)$, $B_i$ to GW-node via secure channel.

Step 2. GW-node $\rightarrow$ $U_i$: Smartcard($R_i$, $B_i$, $h(\cdot)$, $d(\cdot)$, $\tau$) On receiving the registration request, GW-node computes $R_i = h(ID_i\|x) \oplus h(PW_i\|B_i\|b_i)$, where $x$ is a secret key maintained by GW-node. Then, GW-node writes the secure information $\{R_i$, $B_i$, $h(\cdot)$, $d(\cdot)$, $\tau\}$ to the memory of $U_i$’s smart card and issues it to $U_i$ through a secure channel.

Step 3. Upon receiving the smart card, $U_i$ inputs the random number $b_i$ into his/her smart card and finish the registration.
B. Login Phase

When the user $U_i$ wants to access data from the WSN, the login phase is invoked as shown in Fig. 2. He/she must perform the following steps.

Step 1. $U_i$ inserts his/her smart card into the card reader and inputs the personal biometrics $B_i^*$ on the specific device to verify his/her biometrics. If $d(B_i, B_i^*) \geq T$, $U_i$’s smart card rejects the request. Otherwise, $U_i$ enters his/her password $PW_i$ and his/her identity $ID_i$, and then the smart card generates a random number $r_i$ and computes $D_i = R_i \oplus h(PW_i||B_i||b_i)$, $k_i = h(D_i||T_i)$, $C_i = E_{C_k}(ID_i||r_i)$, where $T_i$ is the current timestamp.

Step 2. $U_i \rightarrow$ GW-node: $M_1 = (ID_i, C_i, T_i)$

$U_i$ sends the login message $M_1 = (ID_i, C_i, T_i)$ to the GW-node.

C. Authentication Phase

When the GW-node receives the login request $M_1$ at time $T^*$, it will perform the following steps to authenticate $U_i$.

Step 1. GW-node $\rightarrow$ Sensor node $S_j$: $M_2 = (ID_i, C_q, T_q)$

GW-node checks the freshness of $T_i$ by verifying whether the equation $(T^* - T) \geq \Delta T$ holds. If the equation holds, GW-node stops the session, where $\Delta T$ is the expected time interval for the transmission delay. GW-node computes $D'_i = h(ID_i||x)$, $k'_i = h(D'_i||T_i)$ and $ID'_i||r'_i = D_k(C_q)$. Then GW-node checks whether $ID_i$ and $ID'_i$ are equal. If they are not equal, GW-node stops the session. Otherwise, GW-node computes $C_q = E_{C_k}(ID'_i||r'_i)$ and sends the message $M_2 = (ID_i, C_q, T_q)$ to $S_j$, where $T_q$ is the current timestamp.

Step 2. Sensor node $S_j \rightarrow U_i$: $M_3 = (RM, V_s, T_s)$

Upon receiving the message $M_2$, $S_j$ checks the freshness of $T_q$ by verifying whether the equation $(T^* - T_q) \geq \Delta T$ holds, where $T^*$ is the time $S_j$ receives $M_2$. If the equation holds, $S_j$ stops the session, where $\Delta T$ is the expected time interval for the transmission delay. $S_j$ computes $k'_q = h(h(SID_j||y)||T_q)$ and $ID'_q||r'_q = D_k(C_q)$. Then $S_j$ checks whether $ID'_q$ and $ID_q$ are equal. If they are not equal, $S_j$ stops the session. Otherwise, $S_j$ accepts the response message $RM$.

III. SECURITY WEAKNESSES OF HE ET AL.’S SCHEME

This section demonstrates that He et al.’s scheme [10] has some drawbacks: poor reparability problem, user $U_i$ impersonation attack attacks, and sensor node $S_j$ impersonation attack.

A. Assumptions for Security Analysis [13], [14]

Suppose that an adversary Eve has total control ability over the communication channel between the user $U_i$ and the GW-node (including sensor node $S_j$), which means that he/she can insert, delete, or alter any messages in the channel. According to the researches in [13], [14], all existing smart cards are vulnerable to differential power analysis since the secret values stored into a smart card could be extracted by monitoring its power consumption. Based on these facts[13], [14], this paper assumes that the adversary Eve can steal the user’s smart card and extract the secret values stored in the smart card. Based on these two assumptions, this paper shows some drawbacks of He et al.’s scheme [10].

B. Poor Reparability Problem [11], [12]

He et al.’s scheme is not reparable [11], [12]. In He et al.’s scheme, an adversary Eve can extract the secret value $R_i =$...
Eve can obtain the corresponding password $PW_i$.

Step 1. The adversary Eve intercepts the login request $M_1 = (ID_i, C_i, T_i)$.

Step 2. Eve guesses a password $PW_i$ and then obtains $D_i^*$ by computing $R_i \oplus h(PW_i || B_i || b_i)$.

Step 3. Eve computes $k_i^* = h(D_i^* || T_i)$ and obtains $ID_i^* || r_i^*$ by decrypting $C_i = E_{k_i}(ID_i || r_i)$ with $k_i^*$.

Step 4. Eve verifies $ID_i^*$ is equal to $ID_i$. If $ID_i^* = ID_i$, then Eve has correctly guessed the password $PW_i = PW_i$ and $D_i^* = D_i$.

Step 5. Once the adversary Eve has correctly obtain $D_i = h(ID_i || x)$, then Eve can impersonate the legal user $U_i$.

The above attack can be failed if user $U_i$ has detected that his/her identity $D_i$ has been compromised and then changed his/her current password $PW_i$ via some means that is not specified in He et al.’s scheme [12]. Because the password $PW_i$ is the function of the identity $ID_i$ of the user $U_i$ and the secret key $x$ of GW-node, GW-node has to change $ID_i$ or $x$ when changing the password $PW_i$ for $U_i$. However, we can see that $x$ is commonly used for all users rather than specifically used for only $U_i$ in He et al.’s scheme. That is, it is not reasonable and efficient to change the secret key $x$ for the security of a single user $U_i$. Moreover, it is also impractical to change identity of the user $U_i$. As a result, He et al.’s scheme is not reparable.

\[ h(ID_i || x) \oplus h(PW_i || B_i || b_i), \] biometric impression $B_i$, and random number $b_i$, which is stored in the smart card of the user $U_i$, by using above described differential power analysis attack [13], [14]. After obtaining these secret values $(R_i, B_i, b_i)$, Eve can obtain the corresponding password $PW_i$ by performing the following off-line password guessing attack.

**Fig. 2.** Login and authentication phases of He et al.’s scheme
C. User Uᵢ Impersonation Attack

He et al.’s scheme is vulnerable to the user Uᵢ impersonation attack [15]. Once the adversary Eve obtained PWᵢ through above described differential power analysis attack [13], [14], he/she can obtain the secret value Dᵢ = h(IDᵢ||x) by computing Dᵢ = Rᵢ ⊕ h(PWᵢ||Eᵢ||hᵢ). Then Eve can forge Uᵢ’s login message Mᵢ by computing kᵢ = h(Dᵢ||Tᵢ) and Cᵢ = Eᵢ(1Dᵢ||rᵢ), where Tᵢ is the current timestamp and rᵢ is the random number which generated by the adversary Eve. Finally, Eve sends a forged message Mᵢ = (IDᵢ, Cᵢ, Tᵢ) to the GW-node. It is easy to see the forged message can pass GW-node’s verification because GW-node will also compute same secret value Dᵢ = h(IDᵢ||x) with Dᵢ and its secret key x. Hence, He et al.’s scheme is vulnerable to user Uᵢ impersonation attack.

D. Sensor Node Sᵢ Impersonation Attack

He et al.’s scheme is vulnerable to sensor node Sᵢ impersonation attack [15]. Once the adversary Eve obtained the secret value Dᵢ = h(IDᵢ||x) by the above described differential power analysis attack [13], [14], he/she can impersonate the sensor node Sᵢ as follows:

Step 1. Upon intercepting the login request message Mᵢ = (IDᵢ, Cᵢ, Tᵢ), Eve computes kᵢ = h(Dᵢ||Tᵢ) and obtains IDᵢ||rᵢ by decrypting Cᵢ as IDᵢ||rᵢ = Dᵢ(1Cᵢ).

Step 2. Eve masquerades the sensor node Sᵢ by computing Vᵢ = h(IDᵢ||rᵢ||RMᵢ||Tᵢ) and sending a forged message Mᵢ = (RMᵢ, Vᵢ, Tᵢ) to Uᵢ, where Tᵢ is the current timestamp and RMᵢ is the fixed Sᵢ’s respond message.

It is easy to see that the forged message Mᵢ = (RMᵢ, Vᵢ, Tᵢ) can pass Uᵢ’s verification because Vᵢ is always equal to h(IDᵢ||rᵢ||RMᵢ||Tᵢ). Hence, He et al.’s scheme is vulnerable to Sensor node Sᵢ impersonation attack.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

This paper demonstrated that He et al.’s robust biometric-based user authentication scheme for WSNs has some drawbacks: poor redefinability problem, user Uᵢ impersonation attack, and sensor node Sᵢ impersonation attack. Thus, He et al.’s scheme cannot be applicable to real WSN communication environments. The schemes based on timestamps must overcome the problems of clock synchronization and delay-time limitation so that we better implement them in fast local area networks. Because He et al.’s scheme also used timestamps to resist replay attacks, the scheme can lead to serious clock synchronization problems, namely that the user’s time and the GW-node’s time (including sensor nodes) must differ only in a small range. For example, in a large-scale WSN network, it is almost impossible to maintain the synchronization of clocks among all entities in the WSN network and to guarantee the delay time of transmission. Further works will be focused on improving the He et al.’s scheme which can be able to provide greater security and provides computation efficiency.

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