A Type of Urban Genesis in Romanian Outer-Carpathian Area: the Genoan Cities

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Abstract—The Mongol expansion in the West and the political and commercial interests arising from antagonisms between the Golden Horde and the Persian Ilkhanate determined the transformation of the Black Sea into an international trade turntable beginning with the last third of the XIIIth century. As the Volga Khanate attracted the maritime power of Genoa in the transcontinental project of deviating the Silk Road to its own benefit, the latter took full advantage of the new historical conjuncture, to the detriment of its rival, Venice. As a consequence, Genoa settled important urban centers on the Pontic shores, having mainly a commercial role. In the Romanian outer-Carpathian area, Vicina, Cetatea Albă, and Chilia are notable, representing distinct, important types of cities within the broader context of the Roman medieval urban genesis typology.

Keywords—Black Sea, Vicina, Cetatea Albă, Chilia.

I. INTRODUCTION

Following the fulminate Mongolian expansion towards the West (1239-1261), the formation of the Golden Horde and the Iranian Ilkhanate generated insurmountable antagonisms between the two state formations, caused by the need to control the main trade routes, which brought consistent incomes. This was the context in which the complex system of alliances emerged, which characterized for a long time the international relations within the Mediterranean-Pontic space, displaying a paramount importance for the destiny of the geopolitical area represented by the Black Sea. The appearance in the second half of XIIIth century of the triangle of Sarai-Cairo-Tabriz forces created a political projection of the 'eternal' antagonism mentioned above. In addition, the overwhelmingly important stakes attracted in the gravitational field of these conflicts the Byzantines, Genoans or Seljuk Turks, secondary actors of a monumental play.

Meanwhile, the Golden Horde continued to promote its political and commercial interests, especially insisting in finding an alternative and countervailing trade route, independent of the one controlled by the Ilkhans and capable of activating exclusively for Sarai’s benefit. Opening the new trade route has actually implied a deviation of the itinerary of the traditional Silk Road on an alignment that had the Far East, the Central Asia and Crimea as landmarks. The deep and immediate objectives of this huge undertaking were the establishment of a permanent and unhindered contact with the Mamluk Egypt (rival of the Mongol Ilkhans, who mastered the important trade point of Tabriz), and the cooperation with the Mediterranean thalassocracy. In addition, geographic reasons made Constantinople, the master of the Straits, an indispensable pillar supporting the whole project imagined at Sarai. Accordingly, immediate interests of the parties determined the quick drawing of an understanding: the Golden Horde and the Mamluk state issued a political alliance, while the Emperor Michael the VIIIth, the newly restorer of the Byzantine rule over the Constantinople, ensured opening the Straits for trading slaves.

Besides the political aspects of the Cairo agreement, one should also emphasize the enrollment in the service of the axis of the maritime power of Genoa, the only one able to commercially and diplomatically ensure the relationship between the two allied Muslim states [1]. After supporting the Byzantine restoration, Genoa was rewarded through the Treaty of Nymphaion (1261) with preeminence in the Pontic area, to the detriment of its rival power, Venice.

II. MAIN GENOAN LOCATIONS IN THE ROMANIAN OUTER-CARPATHIAN AREA

Therefore, special historical and geographical circumstances have led the Golden Horde to stubbornly try to link the Black Sea to the great network of the Euro-Asian trade; the context propelled the Genoans as main characters of “the script” written in Sarai, in the middle of the XIIIth century.

As a result, enjoying an exceptional regime in the Black Sea, guaranteed by the terms of the treaty mentioned above, their colony was permanently installed in Pera (1267), a district of Constantinople, developing its activities to such a degree that it soon overcame the very Byzantine metropolis [2].

Later, Genoa ensured its dominance in the Crimea, as attested to Soldaia/Sudak (1274), before the Pisans or Venetians. Anyway, the reconquest of Constantinople and the end of the Latin Empire (1261) had led to the loss of the privileged position Venice enjoyed for 57 years in the Straits and the Black Sea, and its repeated attempts to return to the Pontic policy met the prompt reactions of its Ligurian rival [3].

Genoa’s full success was achieved by activating the Caffa colony, attested since 1281 [4], the center of the Ligurian commercial policy in the Pontic area. Although somehow confused, the beginnings of the commercial settlement, as
well as the location itself, revealed hidden reasons of that choice, which were confirmed by subsequent developments. However, the relatively modest initial amount of merchant activity expanded significantly between 1285 and 1290, while Armenia Minor was abandoned for good in the hands of Mamluks [5].

During the same period, the Lower Danube area captures the attention of the Genoa’s merchants, who had solid settlements in Maurocastro (Cetatea Albă) and Vicina. Later, in a particular historical context, on which it will be elaborated below, the same Genoans will turn Chilia into a prosperous settlement, with great economic potential.

In order to illustrate the geographical position of the three settlements, a representative map is reproduced below. (Fig. 1).

![Fig. 1. Vicina (Măcin), Chilia and Cetatea Albă in report with Bugeac (marked on the map) and Danube Delta Gates](image)

**A. Vicina**

Thanks to the researches carried out some decades ago by the historian Gh. I. Bratianu [6], among others [7], Vicina and the questions related to it quickly became a part of the international scientific circuit, occupying one of the most significant places in Romanian and European historiography. Bratianu’s conclusions based on documents issued at Caffa or Pera, firstly pointed to the unexpected intensity of commercial relations involving Vicina. Thus, in the summer of 1281, one Genoan notary of Pera, Gabriel Predono, recorded 27 commercial agreements having Vicina as destination, amounting to 3241 hyperpera, namely 20% of the total number of the registered businesses [8]. Surprisingly, at the time, Vicina’s trade with Pera exceeded, in value and number of contracts, that of Caffa.

Goods circulating through Vicina were diverse: Western cloth and fabrics, oriental silk, oils, flax or even gold. Among the local products sought by the Genoans merchants wax, honey and especially wheat prevailed. Thus, during 1335 or 1340, the Florentine Pegolotti mentioned in his treaty named *La pratica della mercatura*, “Vezina wheat” [9]. There is, unfortunately, no indication in the documents of the time of the identity of the producers of these goods, most likely traded through Italian or Greek intermediaries, who sailed on the Danube, to the locations where they could meet the caravans coming from the inside [10].

Although all contracts mentioned above used virtually without exception the Byzantine hyperpera, historical documents made an important reference helping the estimation of Vicina’s commercial importance: the existence of a so-called hyperpera of Vicina, or a Vicina measure, indicating, without doubt, that like Pera, Caffa and Trebizond, the city had its own measurement units and perhaps a special coin, a copy of the Byzantine one. According to Brătianu, this exclusivity of the imperial currency fitted some curious remarks, contained in two of the Genoan commercial contracts, which seemed to suggest that the city was at that time part of the Byzantine Empire [11].

In fact, references regarding the inclusion of the Vicina in the jurisdiction of the Byzantine territories should not surprise very much. As mentioned above, the agreement between the Golden Horde, the Mamluk Sultanate of Egypt and Michael the VIIIth Palaiologos, allowed the latter the recovery from the Bulgarians of some towns located on the west coast of the Black Sea as well as the imposition of the imperial authority in the islands of the Lower Danube, directly controlled by the Tartars.

Moreover, the same context is responsible for the possibility of establishing the orthodox Archdiocese of Vicina, like the one established at Sarai (1261), or the one taken under the Byzantine protectorate, at Cairo (1262). Furthermore, it seems that the establishment of the Archdiocese of Vicina, and even its attaining the rank of Metropolitan both took place before the restoration of the Empire [12].

Far from being a simply local bishop, the ruler of this religious institution had, in 1302, not only a remarkable annual income, but also a political authority firmly supported by the Constantinople, which allowed him to negotiate the receiving in the Empire of a group of 16,000 Alaniams [13].

Back to the economic activities attested in Vicina, the last entry of the XIIIth century (1294) refers to a list of damages claimed by the Genoan ambassador from the imperial administration, in order to cover taxes abusively solicited from several Genoan ships. The same document mentions a vessel sailing to Maurocastro (Cetatea Albă), located at the gates of Dniester, the new commercial outlet which flourished in the following centuries, affecting, among others, Vicina’s prosperity [14].

In order to briefly describe the historical context of Vicina’s demise, one should begin with information provided by Western nautical maps, provided that they are not very accurate or entirely credible [15]. Thus, the Catalan charter Angelino Dulcert’s map of 1339, locates Vicina on the Danube, also called, significantly, *fluvius Vicine*. These cartographic details are partially confirmed in an act issued from Pera, in 1343, stating that the margins of Özbek’s Empire reach “flumen Vicine” [16]. More importantly, over the walls
of this city stood the Tatar flag with the *tamgha* and the *half-moon*, which meant the Tatars were *effectively* installed in the city.

Treated separately, this would not be so serious, given that the Horde permanently controlled the Lower Danube for a century, since the second half of the XIIIth century. Nevertheless, the broader context of the political crisis from the middle of the XIVth century hastened the negative developments in the history of Vicina. Therefore, it is entirely justified to look at the gradual withdrawal of the Mongol authority before the Christian offensive as to a major contributing factor in explaining, as it will be pointed below, the irreversible and fast decadence of the town, and also the formation of new commercial axes, which did not pass along Vicina [17]. The city is absent from all documents related to the turn of the century. The XIVth-XVth century transition ends with the final establishment of the Turkish domination in Dobrogea. During the XVth century, there is a mention of Vicina in harbor maps, as “a postume reflex of a glorious past” [18], combined with some ambiguous references, supporting a pale existence of the city.

At the end of this brief review, one is bound, however, to offer the explanation of an old dilemma: where was Vicina located [19]? Without further details, already discussed, one should state the following: although P. Diaconu’s opinion, expressed many years ago by, equalling the *ghostly* city of Vicina with Păcuilul lui Soare, remains until today the most well reasoned [20], a new analysis, not yet published, will prove that the famous Genoan settlement was actually located on the site of the present-day harbor town Măcin (Fig. 2). For this information we must thank Professor V. Ciocăltan.

**B. Cetatea Albă**

Due to researches conducted by G. I. Bratianu, one could find that the first mention of the Genoan trade in Cetatea Albă belonged to an act of partnership, transcribed in Caffa by a Genoan notary and dated 8 May 1290, which referred to the journey of a certain Giacomo di Finale to an area named “*ad partes Malvocasti*” [21]. Four years later, a boat belonging to Genoan merchants was mentioned, heading to “*Maurocastrum*” [22].

The medieval city of Cetatea Albă established on the ruins of the antique Greek city of Tyras had many names (Moncastro/Asprokastron/Belgorod/Akkerman), which caused misidentifications of Cetatea Albă for cities with almost identical names [23]. However, the information point to the early presence of the Genoans in the old Byzantine Maurokastron, who, undoubtedly, as well as the whole North Pontic region, was controlled by the Mongols. It is quite likely that, at the time of the writing of this document, the Ligurian settlers developed only commercial activities; a possible fortification of their area was not to be seen until maybe the XIVth century (Fig. 3-4).

The following context bolsters the arguments presented here:

At the end of the XIIIth century, the fall in the hands of the Muslims of the Acre city, the eastern outpost of the Venetian trade, determined a shift of *Serenissima*’s policy towards the Black Sea. It seems that this option, which was certainly contrary to the hastened rise of the Genoan hegemony, was enhanced by the alliance with Nogai, the almighty general of the Horde, in the North Pontic area [24]. In this context, the
Straits War (1294-1299) was inevitable, which will not work out - in spite of Genoa’s victories - the problem of the autonomous presence of the Venetians in the Black Sea. The Milan Treaty provided only a postponement of the situation, opening up, however, a new phase of Genoa’s policy, with direct consequences on the settlement of the Dniester estuary.

Thus, the violent inclusion of Venice in “the game” of the benefits provided by the independent presence in Pont has warned the Genoans; they initiated a broad campaign for the strengthening of the emporiums previously founded. Although inevitably meeting the opposition of the Byzantines, and the Mongols, the ambitious Ligurian merchants succeeded, however, with an unsurpassed diplomatic skill, but also through involvement in bloody conflicts, to impose their will. Beginning with Pera (after 1300), Caffà (after 1313) and Trebizond (after 1316), these approaches [25] continued, most likely, with the strengthening of Cetatea Albă, Vicina or Licostomo cities.

Unlike the situation in Chilia or Vicina, it appears, however, that Cetatea Albă was deprived of the benefits of having its own administration, with a consul and related institutions; the highest authority in the city was held by the Mongol ruler. Moreover, archeological findings from the XIIIth-XVth centuries show a well-defined Byzantine feature [26], which conceals the contributions of the Genoans.

Even in the absence of a consul, the Ligurian traders’ activities in the Dniester estuary have proved to be wide-ranging, focusing with priority on the trade of cereals. A series of documents confirm this assessment, culminating with references like “Cetatea Albă wheat” (Granano da Maocastro), according to the famous trade manual of Florentine Francesco Balducci Pegoletti, written in the first half of XIVth century [27].

Another strong element of the Genoan activities around Moncastro was the slave trade. Without too many scruples shown, and despite repeated papal intervention, the Genoans conducted extensive business in buying slaves from Cetatea Albă. Alongside Cumans, Bulgarians, Russians, Turks, Alanimi etc., Vlachs [28] were also sold in distant locations [29].

Without going into details on the variety of products conveyed through Cetatea Albă [30], it must be noticed its important role in the international trade, that constitutes, especially towards in the end of XIVth century, representing a valuable point of transit, as an intermediate linking the Black Sea basin and the Central Europe.

This was due to the use of the “Moldavian road” going Lvov - Suceava - Iași - Cetatea Albă, in a special context upon which it will be elaborated elsewhere. For now, it will be only pointed to the existence of important historical antecedents, which endowed Cetatea Albă with a permanent upward development. Even since 1339, Angelino Dulcet seized the huge economic potential of Lvov (“civita de leou”), where merchants coming from the Black Sea met with the Hanseatic ones and continued their trade march towards the Baltic Sea and Flanders, to Bruges: “This is the road which will soon be protected by the ruler of the Moldavian Voivodat, whose limits will rapidly spread from the Bukovina Carpathians to the mouths of the Dniester, where stands the fortress and the harbor Cetatea Albă” [31].

C. Chilia

Before emphasizing the features which include Chilia in the type of urban settlements born with the fundamental help of the Genoan trade, our position regarding the much disputed issue of identity or distinction between the famous sites along the Danube, Chilia and Licostomo [32] must be stated. Taking into account both the older [33] and the newer [34] historiographical investigations, the view of those who consider the two names as referring to different settlements is supported in the present contribution. Their geographical location has been described as “a castle, Licostomo, located on a small island, right where the Danube’s Chilia channel flows into the sea, and a fortress, Chilia, located slightly upstream on the banks of the same river shore” [35].

Except the IXth century Byzantine mention of Licostomo, the first attestations of Chilia are related to its occurrence in a list of possessions of the Patriarchy of Constantinople, dated between 1318 and 1323 [36], and to the devastating incursion of Umar Beg of Aydin, two decades later [37].

Exceptionally valuable information are to be found in the records of the Genoan notary Antonio di Ponzo, dating from the years 1360-1361, and published by G. Pistarino [38]. They actually represent a fundamental source for deciphering several essential aspects regarding the medieval society from the Gates of the Danube. A huge number of documents, accurately registered in Chilia, mention a Genoan consul (Barnabo di Carpena), who managed an intensive economic activity.

Focusing the attention to the historical circumstances which led to integration of Chilia into the “constellation” of the Genoan settlements in the mid-fourteenth century, one would note several issues of major importance, regarding the Ligurian commercial interests in the direction of Central Europe.

The fierce rivalry between Genoa and Venice, which already degenerated by the end of the XIIIth century, during the first Straits War (1294-1299), evolved into a new, more heated phase, after Özbek Khan offered a strip of land at Tana (1332/1333) to the Serenissima’s merchants. Their right to construct public and private buildings, which secured the foundation for an autonomous commercial presence in the Pont area, was to represent “an exceptionally serious breach in the Genoan dam” [39].

Consequently, the Ligurian Republic felt obliged to take a firm action aiming at strengthening its Pontic positions, including aggressive actions against its eternal rival, which eventually led to other two Straits Wars (1350-1355 and 1376-1381). It this context, no later than 1359, the Genoans took control of the military and commercial complex Licostomo-Chilia (Fig. 5), in the same time entering into a political
relationship of co-involvement with the Hungarian Kingdom [40].

In the background of wars for Galicia, a broad anti-Mongol campaign (1342-1355), Louis the Great (1342-1382) has already started to approach gradually the lower Danube. Moreover, the Hungarians own conflicts with the Republic of St. Mark for the rule of the Dalmatian coast brought them even closer to the Genoans. But the main, catalyst factor of all these developments was certainly the allies’ intuition of the immense, but still unraveled economic potential of the trade route Brașov - Chilia, linking via Hungary the Black Sea to Central Europe.

The privilege received by the Brasov merchants in 1358 [41], coupled with the favors granted them by the Wallachian Prince Vladislav Vlaicu ten years later [42], and the agreement between the Angevine King and the so-called “dominium Demetrius, princeps Tartarorum” [43], the ruler of the area north of the Danube gates, will integrate, for a century and a half, Hungary and Wallachia with Brașov and Brăila, into a large, international trade circuit.

The new political and economic realities found Vicina far-flung from the recently activated major trade routes, therefore in an unfortunate position. Left at the discretion of the despot Dobrotich, the new ruler of the area, Vicina gradually faded away, passing to Chilia the mission to convey the huge values carried all over Wallachia.

III. CONCLUSIONS

In a stark contrast to the fact of urban continuity in Western Europe, where the gradual dissolution of Roman sociopolitical structure has been efficiently counteracted by the presence of the bishop’s authority, the cities from the north-Danubian former province have quickly ceased their existence, immediately after the Aurelian’s retreat (271-275).

In fact, the special historical circumstances related to the violent character of the repeated Barbarian intrusion into this territory, make also necessary to see the rebirth of the urban life in the outer Carpathians space as a reality that cannot predate the return of the Byzantine authority on the Lower Danube, towards the end of the first millennium AD.

The brutal dissappearance of the Byzantine settlements founded on that occasion, in the context of the Turanic invasions from the XI-XII centuries, was soon to be compensated by the gradual emergence of some new urban cores, such as the Genoese colonies Cetatea Albă and Chilia, but particularly of the famous Vicina. Although undoubtedly standing as foreign political and economic initiatives, these settlements, implanted in the Romanian environment, and certainly not deprived by indigenous ethnic element, must be unequivocally treated as a distinct and unified typological category.

REFERENCES


Fig. 5. Chilia and Licostomo on the map of Danube Gates


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